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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the economic problems of toll 
roads and to suggest solutions to those problems. The major difficulty to be 
confronted is that  of ‘unscrambling the egg’, that is, of dealing with the 
complications created by past policy mistakes, which have been locked in through 
long-term toll road contracts 
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Unscrambling the Toll Road Egg1 
1. Introduction 
The development of road infrastructure has been a central component of Australian 
national development since the early 20th century. For most of this period, roads were 
planned and constructed by the public sector and financed indirectly, through vehicle 
registration fees and petrol taxes. 
More recently, concern about the problems of road transport has focused on the 
problems of toll roads, including pricing, performance and ownership. Since the value 
of a road network does not depend on a single road, but on the transport system as a 
whole, efficient management of toll roads are crucial to the nation’s welfare, even 
when individual roads are privately owned. 
The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the economic problems of toll roads 
and to suggest solutions to those problems. The major difficulty to be confronted is 
that  of ‘unscrambling the egg’, that is, of dealing with the complications created by 
past policy mistakes, which have been locked in through long-term toll road contracts. 
 The article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the 
Australia road network, the history of toll roads and the main issues of the toll road 
network. In Section 3, the evolution of policy is examined, with particular emphasis 
on the Public Private Partnership (PPP), ownership and operation. The major 
economic issues associated with performance and demand are outlined. Section 4 
provides a framework for the economic analysis of these problems based on the 
concepts of externality, efficiency, and competition. These concepts are used to 
derived recommendations of policy responses to the failures of the private toll road 
model.  
2. Background 
2.1. The Road Network 
Roads are the most important single item of infrastructure spending for governments 
in Australia (Productivity Commission, 2017). The value of national road assets has 
been estimated at over $280 billion (Roads Australia 2013). Annual road-related 
expenditure for the Commonwealth government is about $50 billion (BITRE 2016)The 
total length of roads was nearly 900 000 kilometres in 2015 (BITRE 2015). Annual road 
vehicle kilometre travelled (VKT) reached over 220 billion km in 2010, compared to 
around 50 billion km in 1965 (BITRE 2011). 
                                                
1 This paper is based on a presentation for the 2017 Colin Clark lecture. 
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As a network asset, the value of a road depends, almost entirely, on the roads and 
other transport links to which it connects, instead of the road itself solely. Additions 
to the network may either enhance or reduce the value of existing roads. When 
designed carefully, additions can reduce traffic. However, in some cases, additions 
can reduce the value of the network as a whole. The first case is known as the induced 
demand effect. For example, with the expansion of roads, urban sprawl can lead to 
more traffic, instead of curing congestion as expected.  
The second case is that inappropriate expansion of the road network can be 
counterproductive (Braess 1968). Braess’ Paradox is illustrated by examples in which 
traffic flow may be improved by closing some existing roads. 
2.2. History of Toll Roads 
Toll roads have a long history in Australia, but remained rare until recently. The first 
toll road connecting Sydney and Parramatta was built early in the 19th century 
(Productivity Commission 2017). A hundred years later, the first toll bridge, Sydney 
Harbour Bridge was completed. It was not until the 1990s that involvement of the 
private sector began to increase, leading to a significant expansion of toll roads in 
Australia (Quiggin 2005, BITRE 2018). 
The total length of the 16 toll roads currently in operation is 241 km (BITRE 2018). As 
shown in Table 1, eight are in New South Wales, six in Queensland, and two in 
Victoria. Most of these roads have been built under the Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) model.  
Table 1. Current toll roads in operation in Australia. 
Type Name State 
Lengt
h (km) 
Original owner 
Majority 
Owner 
Operator 
 
1.Sydney 
Harbour Bridge 
NS
W 
1.1 
NSW Dept. of 
Public Works 
RMS RMS 
Harbour/rive
r crossing 
2.Sydney 
Harbour Tunnel 
NS
W 
2.7 
Transfield Pty 
Ltd & Kumagai 
Gumi 
Kumagai 
Gumi (50%) 
Tunnel 
Holdings 
Pty Ltd 
  
3.Go Between 
Bridge 
QLD 0.3 
Brisbane City 
Council 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
 
4.Cross City 
Tunnel 
NS
W 
2.1 
CCT 
Motorways 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
 
5.Lane Cove 
Tunnel 
NS
W 
3.8 
Connector 
Motorways 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
 4 
Tunnels or 
roads with 
tunnels 
6.Clem7 QLD 6.8 
River City 
Motorways 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
 7.Airport Link QLD 6.7 
BrisConnection
s 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
  8.Legacy Way QLD 5.7 
Brisbane City 
Council 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
Intra-city 
links -short 
9.M1(Eastern 
Distributor) 
NS
W 
6 
Airport 
Motorway Pty 
Ltd 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
         --long 10.M2(Hills) 
NS
W 
21 
Hills Motorway 
Pty Ltd 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
 11.M7 (Westlink) 
NS
W 
40 
Western 
Sydney Orbital 
Pty Ltd 
Transurban50
% 
Transurba
n 
 
12.M5(South-
West) 
NS
W 
22 
Interlink Roads 
Pty Ltd 
Transurban50
% 
Transurba
n 
 13.CityLink VIC 22 Transurban Transurban 
Transurba
n 
 14.EastLink VIC 39 ConnectEast 
Horizon Roads 
Pty Ltd 
Horizon 
Roads Pty 
Ltd 
 
15.Gateway 
Motorway 
QLD 23.1 
Queensland 
Investment 
Corp. 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
  
16.Logan 
Motorway 
QLD 38.7 
Logan 
Motorways Pty 
Ltd 
Transurban 
Transurba
n 
Source: BITRE (2018). 
2.3. Externalities 
Although road infrastructure brings various benefits to an economy, road transport 
has also been associated with a range of negative environmental and health problems, 
some of which are specifically linked to motorists while others reflect more general 
impacts on the public. These negative impacts may be divided into four main 
categories: congestion; crash risk; noise and local air pollution; and carbon dioxide 
emissions.  
Congestion is one of the most important and direct negative externalities caused by 
driving. When entering a road, a motorist imposes costs on all the other drivers using 
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the road, while incurring costs in return. Each additional motorist reduces the mobility 
provided by the road and increases the time spent by other drivers using the road. 
Since no-one bears the costs they generate themselves, congestion is excessive. 
Driving in rush hours generates more congestion costs than driving in non-rush hours. 
Similarly, driving in urban roads generates more congestion costs than driving in rural 
roads. Under current funding systems, there is, in general, no price distinction 
between driving under different conditions. Drivers on less busy roads, travelling in 
non-rush hours are subsidising drivers in rush hours who generate more congestion. 
An ideal system of road pricing would take this into account. 
It might seem that the introduction of toll roads represents a step in the direction of 
sound road pricing. In reality, however, toll roads are typically uncongested, and are 
underused as a result of tolls.  
Second, there are problems associated with crashes that cause fatalities and severe 
injuries. Road crashes are one of the leading causes of premature death for people 
under 45 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017, Burke and Teame 2018).  
Car accidents not only risk the lives of on-road motorists and passengers, but also non-
motorists including cyclists and pedestrians.  
Estimates of the economic damage caused by road crashes raise problematic issues 
including the economic value of life and health. A conservative estimate is that road 
crashes imposed a financial burden $30 billion on the Australian economy in 2015 
(Economic Connections 2017) 
Third, there are problems of noise and local air pollution, correlated to the volume of 
traffic and the combustion of fossil fuels, affecting those living close to road links. The 
World Health Organisation (WHO 2011) revealed that transport noise is a major cause 
for health problems including sleep disturbance, hearing loss, cardiovascular 
problems and learning difficulties for children. Researchers also discovered that all of 
the capital cities in Australia suffer from unacceptably high levels of road traffic noise 
which exceeded the levels recommended by WHO (Brown and Bullen 2003). 
Petrol and diesel-fuelled vehicles are a major source of urban air pollution. Major 
pollutants are particulate matter (PM), hydro carbons (HC), nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
carbon monoxide (CO) and sulphur dioxide (SO2). Although Australia has long 
implemented vehicle emissions standards, these standards have been offset by 
increasing vehicle use 
Finally, there are het problems of carbon dioxide emissions and climate change at the 
global level, resulting from the use of fossil fuels at road transport. Road sector 
transport accounts for about 15 per cent of the total emissions in Australia (Climate 
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Change Authority 2014). Traditional petrol and diesel-fuelled vehicles emit carbon 
dioxide directly from the combustion process. In the last few years, there have been 
proposals to improve fuel efficiency of light vehicles (i.e. CCA, 2014). However, 
political resistance has so far prevented implementation of the proposed standards. 
This problem cannot be simply resolved by switching to electric vehicles. For example, 
Wang (2018) argued that taken into account the life-cycle emissions, electric vehicles 
produce as much as CO2 as a traditional vehicle in the Australian context, where 
electricity production heavily relies on coal. Hence, electrification of the car fleet must 
be accompanied by a shift to renewable electricity generation. 
2.4. Haphazard Historical Mix of funding and pricing 
There is no coherent principle underlying road funding and pricing in Australia. 
Motorists and taxpayers contribute to the funding of road infrastructure in two ways: 
consumption independent charges and consumption based charge. The consumption 
independent charges include vehicle registration fees, stamp duty and other vehicle 
administration related fees. The primary consumption-based charge is fuel excise.  
Registration of motor vehicles is done through each state and territory, and 
registration fees vary across states and territory. Collected by state governments, the 
registration fees are fixed for consumption depending on the attributes of a vehicle, 
such as vehicle weight and segment. However, this fee does not depend on the 
distance travelled by a vehicle. Some states charge a traffic improvement fee along 
with the registration fee, but the traffic improvement fee is still not relate to road use. 
Therefore, most problems of road transport are matters beyond the power of the fixed 
charges. 
Another form of charge collected by state and territory is the stamp duty, which is 
another fixed cost for consumers depending on the value of the vehicle. Set by the 
state government, the stamp duty is charged at the initial purchase of the vehicle or 
subsequent transfer. However, this charge is independent of the use of road. 
Fuel excise, a consumption based charge, is another source of road funding. Fuel 
excise is set and collected by Commonwealth. In 2001, the excise rates were adjusted 
with the introduction of GST. In 2006, the new Fuel Tax Credit Scheme commenced to 
provide business and households of fuel that recovers excise under certain conditions 
(Fuel Taxation Inquiry, 2018). Mining and transport industries claimed about $3 
billion fuel credits in year 2009-10 (ATO, 2011), taking up to 80 per cent of the total 
credits of that year. In 2014 the indexation of the fuel-excise tax was reintroduced, 
which has been in effect till present.  
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Road related revenues, however, are not directly used as road funding. These 
revenues become an important part of the government revenue. It can be observed 
that revenue from road use has been declining in recent years mainly due to 
improvements in fuel efficiency of motor vehicles in (Parliament of Australia, 2018). 
Excise of fuel has fallen from 44 per cent to 39 per cent of road related revenue from 
2000 to 2014, while still remaining the largest source of road related revenue (BITRE, 
2015). This falling fuel excise revenue requires new policies be designed to meet the 
growing gap between the need for funding and the current revenue. 
Expenditure patterns are similarly complex The Commonwealth provides funds for 
four categories of expenditure: national projects; strategic regional projects; the Roads 
to Recovery program supporting local roads improvements; and the general Financial 
Assistance Grant program to local government, a portion of which is identified as a 
local road component. State governments fund and maintain arterial roads and 
manage vehicle administration and driver licensing. Local roads are primarily the 
responsibility of local government. At no level are road user payments closely related 
to the fiscal and social cost of providing roads. 
In summary, the current funding system is inequitable, inefficient and probably 
unsustainable in the long run (Deloitte, 2013). 
3. PPPs for Toll Roads 
From the 1970 onwards, governments faced increasingly severe constraints on current 
and capital expenditure. This led to a search for ways of financing infrastructure that 
did not, at least according to standard accounting conventions, involve increases in 
taxation or public debt. Much of the appeal of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and 
particularly of PPP toll roads was derived from these apparent accounting benefits. 
3.1. Inefficiency of Toll Road PPPs 
Tolls are, in general, an inefficient and inequitable method of financing road 
construction. They are inefficient because they discourage the use of new, relatively 
safe and uncongested roads. To avoid the toll on newly constructed motorways, 
motorists use older suburban roads, accepting longer travel times for themselves, 
generating greater air and noise pollution and creating accident risks both for 
themselves and for people living in the areas through which they drive. 
As well as being inefficient, tolls are inequitable because they allocate the burden of 
financing road construction in an arbitrary fashion. In general, the people who have 
historically had the worst deal in road transport are usually the ones who end up 
paying tolls, while those who have always had good roads have them maintained and 
improved free of charge. 
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3.2. Crucial Role of Demand Risk 
The situation is even worse with PPP projects. The basic problem is that the 
government is in a better position to manage demand risk. The flow of traffic on any 
given road will depend on subsequent decisions about urban development and about 
the development of the transport network as whole. A private owner of a single road 
will demand either a high rate of return or a guarantee that future management 
decisions do not adversely affect traffic on the road in question. By contrast, for the 
government which owns the road network as whole, and can tax all road users, risk 
about traffic flows on any one road is unimportant. The government’s concerns go 
beyond the road network — what matters is the performance of the transport system 
as a whole. 
The misallocation of demand risk was evident from the beginning of the push for 
private infrastructure (Quiggin, 1996). However, it was largely disregarded. In the 
1990s, governments were sufficiently desperate to avoid taking on debt that they 
signed contracts on terms highly favourable to the private parties. Notable examples 
include the Citylink project in Melbourne, which remains the most profitable 
motorway in Australia. In cases where demand fell short of expectations, 
governments frequently offered concessions to prevent project failure. 
3.3. The End of the PPP model 
From 2000 onwards, as it became evident that governments had offered excessively 
generous terms, there was an increasing emphasis on securing ‘value for money’.  
Given the misallocation of risk involved in private ownership of roads, this should 
have brought the PPP process to an end. However, the experience of the 1990s 
suggested to many investors that PPP projects were ‘a license to print money’ and 
that, if anything went wrong, governments would come to the rescue. 
As a result, a number of PPP projects went ahead on the basis of highly optimistic 
projections of demand which were never realized.  Examples are illustrated in Figures 
1-6, as follows. 
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Figure 1. Estimated actual patronage compared to CCM’s projections – nine months. 
Source: NSW Audit Office (2006) research. Information on CCM projected patronage 
obtained from RTA documents. Estimated actual patronage based on research plus 
CCM statements where available. 
 
Figure 2. Actual and forecast average daily traffic volumes of Eastlink. 
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Source: Charting Transport (2016) 
 
Figure 3. Predictions and actual volumes of traffic of Clem 7, tunnels between 
Woolloongabba and Bowen Hills cost $3.2 billion since opened in 2010. 
Source: Atfield (2017). 
 
Figure 4. Predictions and actual volumes of traffic of Go Between Bridge, cost $338 
million since opened in 2010. 
Source: Atfield (2017). 
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Figure 5. Predictions and actual volumes of traffic of Airport Link, the 6.7-liometre 
tunnels between various places and airports cost $4.8 billion to build, since opened in 
2012. 
Source: Atfield (2017). 
 
Figure 6. Predictions and actual volumes of traffic of Legacy Way, funded by Brisbane 
City Council borrowings instead of PPP, with one cent from every toll donated to 
Legacy Australia since opened in 2015. 
Source: Atfield (2017). 
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Most of these projects were commenced in the years leading up to the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), when capital markets severely underpriced risk. By the time 
construction was completed, and the failure of demand forecasts was evident, the GFC 
had taken place, and financial institutions were seeking to reduce their risk exposure. 
3.4. The breakdown of the PPP model 
As a result of the GFC, the failed road projects were unable to secure additional 
financing and were sold off. Nearly all ended up under the control of the Transurban 
Corporation, which is now effectively a monopolist in the toll road sector. 
In the wake of the GFC, the traditional PPP model for toll roads was irreparably 
broken. Governments were no longer prepared to pay substantial premiums to 
transfer demand risk to private investors, while investors were unwilling to bear the 
risk without a premium. Consequently, the traditional PPP model has been 
abandoned. 
The relatively limited number of PPP road projects that have proceeded have been 
based on models where governments bear most of the risk. These include ‘supported 
debt’ and ‘availability payments’. In the supported debt model, the initial demand risk 
is borne by governments, borrowing at the public sector discount rate. In the 
‘availability payment’ model, the private party receives a stream of payments, subject 
to the possibility of abatement penalties if service standards are not met. Since the 
imposition of these penalties is rare, the ‘availability payment’ model is effectively 
equivalent to debt financing, though the costs are usually higher. 
4. Recommended Policy responses to existing problems 
An examination of recent developments in road infrastructure management has to be 
informed by the theoretical frameworks described in the previous section and by 
understanding of Australia’s system of government. The starting point of the policy 
process has been the improvement of traffic conditions without increasing 
government debt. This rationale is under question as the public now is bearing more 
costs under current PPP arrangements than it was expected. This sectio offers policy 
recommendations to reform the current road-user charging system that can be more 
efficient and fairer for users.  
4.1.  Road Pricing 
Driving is not costless; it causes congestion, noise and air pollution and crash risk, etc., 
which are the negative externalities drivers do not pay for under current policy 
arrangement. In principle, these issues could be addressed through Pigovian taxes, w 
first proposed in the context of as road pricing by Vickrey (1963). Vickrey (1963) 
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proposed a congestion pricing system for the subway system for the New York City, 
charging different prices at peak and off-peak times.  
Vickrey argued that a similar approach applied to private road transport and 
suggested electronic identifiers be carried in each vehicle and computers be used to 
detect the trip and motorists be billed monthly. Even though this suggestion was 
beyond the technology at that time (1960s), it is now feasible and could be 
implemented by developing existing systems for charging toll road users, such as 
GoVia. 
In practice, however, few policy proposals of this kind have been put on agenda in the 
private road transport policy in Australia. Vickery’s explanation on why this advice 
is not well received still applies to today’s context, that “People see it as a tax increase, 
which I think is a gut reaction. When motorists’ time is considered, it’s really a 
savings”. In the long-run, road pricing could yield more revenue as well as improve 
traffic conditions, and encourage modal shift and provide more welfare to the society. 
These benefits have long been underestimated or ignored throughout time by 
politicians and the public. 
Table 2 gives a general description of the road pricing tools that are being used across 
the world. Road tolls are widely used in Asia and America. Its main purpose is to raise 
revenues. In Australia, roll roads are built to ease traffic congestion. However, the 
effect of road toll on traffic improvements is limited because the toll roads are 
underused due to high rates. Congestion pricing is another form of road pricing, 
which charges different fees at different traffic conditions. With main targets to reduce 
traffic congestion and raise revenues, this approach has been adopted in densely 
populated major cities around the world, such as Melbourne, Singapore and Toronto.  
Congestion pricing applied to city centres has reduced the pressure of traffic during 
peak hours and optimised the usage of existing road infrastructure. Congestion 
pricing is often combined with cordon fees, which are charged for driving in a 
particular area to relieve traffic congestion in high density area, such as a London 
Singapore and Oslo. Managed lanes are a popular tool in the US, which allow high-
occupant-vehicles (HOVs) to travel faster than low-opponent-vehicles which do not 
prefer to pay a fee to use those lines designed for HOVs. This approach allocates the 
existing resources more efficiently and also encourages car-pooling.   
Distance based-fees are used to generate revenues and reduce the use of vehicles as 
well as reduce the negative externalities of private road transport. This method has 
been proposed in the Netherlands and been implemented by Germany on trucks.  
Road space rationing is a second-best approach, restricting road use allowed for 
particular vehicles. A common version of this practise is ‘odds and evens’ rationing, 
 14 
where use is limited according to the final digit of the number plate. This approach 
has been used in a number of jurisdictions, including Beijing. This approach can 
effectively reduce the number of cars on the road at any given time, but implies 
inefficient use of the car fleet.  In particular, motorists with a high demand for travel 
have an incentive to buy additional vehicles, ensuring that the plate numbers are such 
as to allow travel at all times. 
 
 
Table 2   Major application of road pricing in the world. 
Name Description Objectives Country (Area) 
Road toll 
(fixed rates) 
A fixed fee for driving on a 
particular road. 
To raise revenues. Australia, 
China, Japan, 
US 
Congestion 
pricing 
(time-
variable) 
A fee that is higher under 
congested conditions than 
uncongested conditions, 
intended to shift some 
vehicle traffic to other 
routes, times and modes. 
To raise revenues 
and reduce traffic 
congestion. 
Melbourne, 
Singapore and 
Toronto 
Cordon fees Fees charged for driving in 
a particular area. 
To reduce 
congestion in 
densely populated 
urban centres. 
Singapore, 
London, Oslo,  
Managed 
lanes 
A common example is a 
high-occupant-vehicle 
(HOV) lane that 
accommodates a limited 
number of lower-occupant 
vehicles for a fee. 
To encourage 
efficient use of 
existing lanes, and to 
raise revenues 
compared with an 
HOV lane. 
The US. 
Distance-
based fees 
A per kilometre road 
charge. 
To raise revenues 
and reduce various 
traffic problems. 
The 
Netherlands 
and Germany 
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Road space 
rationing 
Revenue-neutral credits 
used to ration peak-period 
roadway capacity. 
To reduce 
congestion on major 
roadways or urban 
centres. 
Mexico, Beijing 
Source: Victoria Transport Policy Institute (2018) 
4.2. Principles of Road Pricing 
A number of principles of road pricing may be derived from standard microeconomic 
principles 
• Charges for road use should cover costs, including return to capital, 
depreciation and maintenance 
• The price of road use should cover marginal costs, including congestion and 
other negative externalities. 
• The price should optimize use of the network as a whole, not individual roads 
and network optimisation requires congestion pricing 
*Revenues from road pricing should be used to balance choices between 
private cars and public transport, and between road and rail. 
Road resources are different from other public goods because road systems form a 
unique network when anyone of the road is congested, it may affect the roads 
connected directly and indirectly to it. Therefore, current toll road pricing in Australia 
may not be optimising the entire network as all of the roads have to be taken into 
account when solving the optimisation problem.  Road pricing is a complex problem 
and should be part of the development of efficiency and optimised road network 
management. Since network management involves a clear and thorough 
understanding of traffic flows, all factors that affect the flows including the number of 
vehicles, the number of lanes, accidents and time, should be considered when 
introducing a pricing tool. It is important to examine the potential changes of these 
factors of road use when simulating scenarios of road pricing strategies. 
Implementing road pricing could affect demand for public transport. Increasing the 
cost of car travel could encourage modal shift from private car use to public transport. 
This would arise both because of substitution effects and because public transport will 
become faster when congestion is reduced by increased pricing of personal vehicles. 
Small (2004) argues that road pricing could set off a ‘virtuous circle’ for mass transit 
where people reduce the use of private vehicles and congestion is reduced. Public 
transport is faster and reduces costs to bus providers, which enables the bus providers 
to further improve the quality of service.     
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4.3.  Unscrambling the egg 
Current road policy in Australia embodies decades of policy failure. Many old 
congested roads are untolled.  In some cases, they serve as ‘rat runs’ to avoid tolls, 
which means that traffic in these areas became even worsened when new toll roads 
were built in these areas. By contrast, new toll roads are underused, having reached 
only 30% to 60% of projected usage in many cases. However, when the demand 
exceeds the supply of toll roads in the next 15 to 30 years, BOOT arrangements mean 
that tolls will be due for removal. All of these issues above have to be addressed as 
soon as possible to avoid further burden to the public. 
It is , therefore, necessary to design new policies that systematically deal with traffic 
congestion, negative externalities and road funding.  A comprehensive road pricing 
policy is essential.  
Perhaps the most urgent need is to introduce congestion pricing in densely populated 
urban areas. With GNSS receivers equipped in automobiles, charges based on the road 
trips can be made simple and easy. Another consideration is the privacy issue, which 
could vary across regions. Singapore, for example, designed privacy in its system, 
while the Swedish economy values transparency highly therefore privacy is less an 
issue (D'Artagnan Pacific Pty Ltd and Ian Wallis Associates, 2018). 
To implement congestion pricing systematically, it is necessary to remove existing toll 
roads. If toll roads are separately managed by different bodies, with the introduction 
of congestion pricing, congestion will not be efficiently solved. Hence, the government 
should repurchase toll roads or replace toll collection with shadow tolls. 
Technological advances offer further possibilities. With the development of self-
driving cars, travel could be automatically tracked therefore pricing can be similarly 
automatically tracked to internalise congestion externalities. 
4.4.  Feasibility and Equity Issues 
Although economists have long argued for road pricing, they have been rarely 
successful in convincing politicians and the public in Australia. We provide here a 
discussion on the fiscal, social and political feasibility of road pricing and relevant 
equity issues.  
Hensher and Mulley (2014) have proposed a revenue neutral policy reform. The 
central theme is to gradually increase usage-based charges while reducing registration 
and others fixed cost.  
Shifting from existing tolls and registration to user charges based on congestion 
pricing in a revenue neutral manner is socially desirable. In the Australian context, 
tolls largely are often imposed on roads serving growing areas with lower income 
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populations. Carefully designing marginally progressive set of steps in introducing 
tools of road pricing are essential to demonstrate the public that equity issues are 
appropriately addressed if registration charges become regressive and CBD 
congestion charges progressive for private motorists, neutral for business.  
Attitudes towards road pricing are changing over time across the world. Solving 
congestion problems in largest cities by imposing congestion pricing and other road 
pricing tools are widely accepted in many developed economies, such as the UK, 
Singapore, the Netherlands and so on. However, in Australia, road policy reform has 
not been put on the policy agenda because of hostile political attitudes. These attitudes 
are gradually changing as congestion is becoming more and more severe in large cities 
and a majority of the toll roads have been proven inefficient.  
Opposition to congestion pricing is likely to be strongest among people who drive 
regularly to the central business district, including businesspeople, politicians and 
journalists. These groups are more politically influential than the beneficiaries of 
reduced registration charges, including those who live far from the city centre and 
may earn lower incomes.  
5. Conclusion 
Fixing the past failures of road pricing policy will be difficult, but not impossible. A 
number of steps can be considered. Inefficient tolls on roads funded by PPPs should 
be gradually removed. This could be done via buyback or shadow pricing . The lost 
revenue could be replaced by congestion pricing. A comprehensive road pricing 
system based on congestion can optimise the use of the existing road network, reduce 
traffic congestion and internalise negative externalities. 
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